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REVIEW
Quantitative evaluation of the results of digital forensic investigations:
a review of progress
Richard E. Overill a and Jan Collie b
aDepartment of Informatics, King’s College London, London, UK; bDepartment of Computing & Communication, The Open
University, Milton Keynes, UK
ABSTRACT
Unlike conventional forensics, digital forensics does not at present generally quantify the
results of its investigations. It is suggested that digital forensics should aim to catch-up with
other forensic disciplines by using Bayesian and other numerical methodologies to quantify
its investigations’ results. Assessing the plausibility of alternative hypotheses (or propositions,
or claims) which explain how recovered digital evidence came to exist on a device could
assist both the prosecution and the defence sides in criminal proceedings: helping the pro-
secution to decide whether to proceed to trial and helping defence lawyers to advise a
defendant how to plead. This paper reviews some numerical approaches to the goal of
quantifying the relative weights of individual items of digital evidence and the plausibility
of hypotheses based on that evidence. The potential advantages enabling the construction
of cost-effective digital forensic triage schemas are also outlined.
KEY POINTS
 The absence of quantified results from digital forensic investigations, unlike those of con-
ventional forensics, is highlighted.
 A number of approaches towards quantitative evaluation of the results of digital forensic
investigations are reviewed.
 The significant potential benefits accruing from such approaches are discussed.
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One of the most striking differences between the
results reported from conventional forensic investi-
gations, involving the examination of physical,
chemical and biological material traces on the one
hand, and those from digital forensic investigations
on the other, is the absence of any quantitative
measures of confidence, plausibility or uncertainty
associated with the latter results. To illustrate, the
random match probability (RMP) of two matching
DNA profiles not belonging to the same person (or
to identical twins) is ca.108, to within a factor of 10,
depending on the number of loci in the profile and
the size of population database [1]. Similarly, in
forensic entomology examination of blow-fly larval
instars can be used to determine the postmortem
interval for a corpse, with a known range of uncer-
tainty related to ambient temperature and humidity.
Such quantitative measures, generally derived the
results of statistical analyses or laboratory experi-
ments, are valuable since they enable both defence
and prosecution sides to evaluate the strength (or
weight) of an individual item of recovered evidence
(e.g. a DNA profile) and, by extension, to estimate
the strength (or plausibility) of a case built from
many such evidential items.
This state of affairs is at least in part related to
the relative maturity of conventional forensic science
in comparison with digital forensics. We might ten-
tatively trace the origin of systematic forensic sci-
ence investigations to be ca.1900 with the
publication of Edward Henry’s fundamental work
on fingerprints [2], followed in 1901 by the estab-
lishment of the Fingerprint Branch at New Scotland
Yard. The subsequent enunciation by Edmond
Locard of his well-known Exchange Principle that
every contact leaves a trace [3] led to important
conceptual and methodological advances in the sci-
ence. Similarly, Cliff Stoll’s tracking of the hacker
Markus Hess [4] and Gene Spafford’s decoding of
the Robert Morris internet worm [5] could be taken
as one measure of the beginning of systematic
digital forensic investigations. It is immediately clear
that conventional forensics has gained a head-start
of around 90 years over digital forensics. However,
given that digital forensic evidence is required to
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meet precisely the same admissibility criteria and
tests of rigour in a court of law as conventional
forensic evidence, it is apparent that there is a
requirement to develop analogous quantifiable me-
trics for the findings of digital forensic investigations.
Fred Cohen, in particular, has made significant
efforts to specify the rigorous scientific and engineer-
ing principles and practices upon which the require-
ments for such metrics should be based [6]. His
work demonstrates that since individual binary bits
have a physical instantiation it is possible to treat col-
lections of them as a “bag of bits” using mathema-
tical concepts from information physics, which can
lead to quantitative findings. It is also worth noting
that a recent Organization of Scientific Area
Committees (OSAC) report [7] briefly considers the
quantitative evaluation of investigative findings, and a
Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence
(SWGDE) report [8] provides numerical error rates
for some common digital forensic processes.
While there has been significant progress in speci-
fying models and processes for the systematisation
of digital forensic investigations, which are aimed at
improving the consistency and reliability of the con-
clusions reached [9–15], it is important to empha-
sise that such developments, invaluable as they
undoubtedly are within their own remit, do not
attempt to directly address the issue of obtaining
quantifiable findings from digital forensic investiga-
tions, analogous to those exemplified at the begin-
ning of this section, which is the principal subject of
this review article.
As a point of clarification, we should note here
that the great majority of the work described in this
review article refers to the quantification of hypo-
theses (propositions or claims) based on the digital
evidence, rather than the quantification of the digital
evidence itself; this is an important distinction. The
only instances cited here involving the quantifica-
tion of digital evidence itself occur in the examples
where conditional probabilities (likelihoods) are
assigned to the nodes of Bayesian networks based
on surveys of experienced domain experts.
Proposition plausibility metrics
The formal relationship between plausibility and
probability can be conveniently expressed as follows:
probabilities signify the quantities that define a par-
ticular monotonic scale on which degrees of plausi-
bility can conveniently be measured [16].
Bayesian methods, based on the conditional proba-
bility theorem of Revd. Thomas Bayes in his renowned
posthumously published essay [17], have recently
been cited as one approach to gaining quantitative
traction in conveying degrees of (un)certainty in
digital forensic results [18]. For a hypothesis (or
proposition, or claim) H, with a single mutually
exclusive and exhaustive alternative H̅, and recovered








where the left-hand side quotient represents the pos-
terior odds ratio, and on the right-hand side the first
quotient represents the prior odds ratio while the
second quotient represents the likelihood ratio (LR).
This simple expression can be generalised in a straight-
forward manner to situations involving multiple mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive alternative hypotheses.
Judea Pearl showed how networks can be defined
and constructed which permit the propagation of
probabilities from initial priors to final posteriors,
based on the values of intervening conditional proba-
bilities [19,20]. One of the first attempts to apply
such quantitative methods to the analysis of an
actual digital forensic investigation was made by
Chow and co-workers using a Bayesian network
model of an illicit peer-to-peer (BitTorrent) upload-
ing case from Hong Kong, China [21]. The prior
probabilities were taken to be strictly noninforma-
tive and the requisite conditional probabilities (like-
lihoods) were elicited from a survey of 31 domain
experts. This model yielded a posterior probability
of ca.92.5% in favour of the hypothesis that an illicit
upload had indeed occurred given that all 18 antici-
pated items of digital evidence were recovered.
Although a credible alternative hypothesis was not
available for this case against which to compare the
result, it corresponds to an LR of ca.12.3 in favour
of the prosecution hypothesis. In subsequent studies,
the sensitivity of this result to the absence of one
(ca.0.08%), two (2.0%) or more items of digital evi-
dence was found to be consistently small, while its sen-
sitivity to uncertainties in the conditional probability
(likelihood) values populating the nodes of the Bayesian
network was also inconsiderable at ca.0.25% [22].
From 20 typical cases of internet auction fraud
prosecuted in Hong Kong, China, Bayesian net-
works for both the prosecution and the defence
cases were created and the LR of these two alterna-
tive explanations for the existence of the recovered
digital evidence was computed to be 164 000 in
favour of the prosecution hypothesis [23]. This find-
ing may be interpreted as providing “very strong
support” for the prosecution’s hypothesis [24]. The
conditional probabilities required for the Bayesian
networks were sourced from a survey of the mem-
bers of the Hong Kong Customs & Excise digital
investigation team involved in the prosecutions.
While LRs are generally regarded as the preferred
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way to present forensic findings when at least two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses are
available, it should nevertheless also be mentioned
that there has been considerable debate regarding the
possible (mis)interpretation of LRs potentially result-
ing in misleading conclusions being drawn [25].
A third example of Bayesian network analysis
involves an actual case from Hong Kong, China of a
leaked confidential (Yahoo!) email; the prior probabili-
ties were taken to be strictly noninformative and the
conditional probabilities (likelihoods) were elicited by
questioning a domain expert. With every anticipated
item of digital evidence successfully recovered the pos-
terior probability in favour of the prosecution hypothesis
was ca.97.2%. While a credible alternative hypothesis
was not available for this case against which to compare
the result, it corresponds to an LR of ca.34.7 in favour
of the hypothesis; however, both single-parameter and
multi-parameter sensitivity analyses resulted in minimal
perturbations to that value [26,27].
While Bayesian networks deal mainly with condi-
tional probabilities, these quantities can on some
occasions be difficult to obtain in a reliable manner.
In such situations it may instead be possible to
apply conventional (frequentist) probability theory
to the evaluation of the plausibility of a hypothesis
put forward by either the prosecution or the defence
side. For example, in cases where a seized computer
is found to contain a relatively small number of illicit
images or videos (e.g. of child pornography) amongst
a much larger number of non-illicit material (e.g. of
adult pornography) it is possible to use an Urn
Model [28,29] and the Binomial Theorem to calculate
the probability of the inadvertent download defence,
under the assumption of random browsing activity.
In two actual cases from Hong Kong, China the 95%
confidence interval for the plausibility of this defence
was shown to be ca.[0.03%, 2.54%] and ca.[0.00%,
4.35%], respectively [30].
In cases where very large quantities of illicit materi-
als are recovered from a seized computer, the Trojan
horse defence (THD) [31,32] is sometimes invoked to
explain their presence. In such situations an analysis
of the complexity of the processes involved in the
alternative hypothetical explanations can be instructive.
Operational complexity models count the number of
operations (e.g. at byte-level) required to achieve the
presence of the recovered materials by each of the two
alternative mechanisms; the principle of least contin-
gency, which asserts that (ceteris paribus) a simpler
mechanism is more likely than a more intricate
mechanism, then enables the odds ratio for the two
alternatives to be computed as the inverse of the ratio
of their complexities. In a particular scenario involving
the deposition of a single 1MB image the odds against
the THD were calculated to be just 2.979:1; these odds
were lengthened to 197.9:1 if an up-to-date malware
scanner was known to be operational at the material
time [33]. A similar complexity based analysis has also
been used to compute the odds against the THD for
the five most commonly occurring cyber-crimes in
Hong Kong, China [34], where ratios of between
100:1 and 1 000:1 were found; these odds ratios were
subsequently furnished with worst case uncertainty
bounds using standard error propagation theory to
investigate the possibility of overlapping lower and
upper bounds between the criminal and the THD
hypotheses, respectively [35].
Knowing the relative plausibility of alternative
hypotheses explaining the existence of the recovered
digital evidence can be a valuable tool for aiding the
investigating authority in deciding whether or not to
refer a case to the prosecuting authority, and equally in
assisting the prosecution authority in deciding whether
or not to proceed to trial. Conversely, such quantitative
information could also be made use of by the defence
side in deciding how to plead: if the prosecution’s case
is overwhelmingly plausible then the defendant may be
advised to plead guilty whereas if its plausibility is only
marginal then a not guilty plea might be entered. In
some jurisdictions it is also possible that an expert wit-
ness might be permitted to bring forward such data as
part of their testimony at trial.
Probative value metrics
The probative value (or strength, or weight) of an indi-
vidual item of digital evidence in the context of a par-
ticular criminal case reflects the degree to which the
presence of that item of evidence, if recovered, contri-
butes to the overall plausibility of the hypothesis con-
cerning the processes that created all of the recovered
digital evidence. Perhaps the simplest method to achieve
this is to take the difference in the posterior probabilities
of the Bayesian network for the hypothesis in the pres-
ence and in the absence of that item of evidence [36]. A
second method is to generate the so-called Tornado dia-
gram for the Bayesian network, which shows the
ordered range of variation in posterior probability due
to each evidential item with respect to all the remaining
items [37]. Another, still more sophisticated, approach is
to use information theory: the Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence of the Shannon entropy gives the information
gain as a measure of the difference between the proba-
bility distributions for the Bayesian network with (P)
and without (Q) that item of evidence:






These three approaches lead to somewhat diffe-
rent orderings for the evidential weights of the
BitTorrent case mentioned above [38].
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In digital forensic investigations it is commonly
the case that the individual items of digital evidence
may, at least to a first approximation, be considered
conditionally independent of one another. Knowing
the relative importance of each individual item of
digital evidence in an investigation can then enable
an efficient digital investigation scheme to be
devised in which the most highly probative eviden-
tial items are searched for first, in order, relegating
the items of lesser importance until later. If one or
more of the anticipated items of high importance
are not recovered the search may be de-prioritised
or even abandoned; conversely, if all of the antici-
pated items of high importance are found then it
may not be considered necessary to search for those
items of lowest importance as the overall plausibility
of the investigative hypothesis would not be sensibly
improved by doing so.
In addition, such priority-driven investigation
schemes can be termed cost-effective if they are
extended to utilise economic criteria such as Return
on Investment (RoI) or Cost–Benefit Ratio (CBR),
through a knowledge of the resources (e.g. person-
nel, time, specialised equipment, etc.) required to
recover and analyse each anticipated item of digital
evidence [39,40].
Summary and conclusions
We have endeavoured to make the case that digital
forensics should aim to catch-up with conventional
forensics in providing quantified results from its
investigations, despite the intrinsically sensitive and
volatile nature of much digital evidence. A number
of methodologies, such as Bayesian networks, com-
plexity theory, probability theory and statistics, and
information theory, by which this may be accom-
plished have been outlined and some typical results
have been summarised. The uses to which such
quantitative results could be put in both investiga-
tive and juridical contexts have also been briefly
explored. In particular it should be emphasised that
by bringing digital forensics into line with conven-
tional forensic science, expert witness testimony and
examiners’ investigation reports can offer the courts
a transparent rationale for the degree of certainty
associated with their conclusions, rather than relying
on previous relevant experience as the sole deter-
minant of their expert opinion.
Ongoing and future lines of research in this area
are likely to involve comparative studies of different
measures of complexity [41] as applied to evaluating
the plausibility of investigative hypotheses.
Comparative studies of the divergence of various
forms of entropy [42] applied to the quantification
of evidential weight (or probative value) is also
likely to be productive. Another potentially worth-
while avenue of research involves the pre-emptive
analysis of the plausibility of novel, so-far-unused
cybercriminal defences, for example the cosmic ray
defence (CRD) where power law statistics guided by
Moore’s law enabled the prediction of a 512-fold
increase in the incidence of CR-induced memory
bit-flips since 1994, unless protected by sufficiently
powerful error correcting codes [43].
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